I N T R O D U C T I O N
to be a growing emphasis in studies of phenology, the discipline that concerns itself with the timing of events, on patterns of delayed autumn phenology and the role of this in lengthening growing seasons in the northern hemisphere (Jeong et al. 2011; Archetti et al. 2013; Richardson et al. 2013; Garonna et al. 2014; Tang et al. 2015) . For instance, a recent analysis of global trends in plant phenological dynamics utilizing three decades of satellite-derived Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) data concluded that trends in end of season phenology were generally stronger than those in start of season phenology, and contributed relatively more to trends in annual growing season length (Garonna et al. 2016) . Additional examples of delayed onset or occurrence of phenological events associated directly or indirectly with warming have been documented in butterflies (Altermatt 2012; Diamond et al. 2014; Karlsson 2014) , birds (Beaumont et al. 2006; Lee et al. 2011 ), plants (Prieto et al. 2009 Bokhorst et al. 2011; Liancourt et al. 2012; Dorji et al. 2013; Ishioka et al. 2013; Laube et al. 2014; Bjorkman et al. 2015; Marchin et al. 2015; Rawal et al. 2015; Mulder et al. 2017) , dragonflies (Doi 2008) , grasshoppers (Forrest 2016), penguins (Hindell et al. 2012) , noctuid moths (Liu et al. 2011 ), intertidal gastropods (Moore et al. 2011 , and leatherback turtles (Neeman et al. 2015) , to name a few. Additionally, recent analyses of satellite NDVI data indicate that phenological dynamics across over half of the Earth's land surface have changed by more than two standard deviations since 1981 (Buitenwerf et al. 2015) .
Such patterns complement an existing body of work in this field that has also emphasized the absence of any discernable phenological trends in some traits, species, or study locales (Hart et al. 2014) . For instance, a long-term observational study of first spring flight dates of 23 species of butterflies in California reported a mean advance of 24 days over 31 years among the four species undergoing significant advances in flight dates (Forister and Shapiro 2003) . The same study reported, however, no significant change in first spring flight dates in the remaining 19 species (Forister and Shapiro 2003) . Furthermore, an updated analysis of an extension of this data set that included observations through 2015 reported significant delays in first spring flight dates in two of the species monitored (Forister and Shapiro in press). Hence, although phenological advance appears more commonly in the literature, delays and stasis are not entirely uncommon.
Phenology has long been studied in the context of dynamical responses to the alleviation of environmental constraints on the expression of life history traits related to timing (Sørensen 1941; Caprio 1957; Lack 1966; Goff and Cole 1976; Harris 1977; Sugg et al. 1983; Breeman et al. 1988; Stamou et al. 1993; Silvertown et al. 1997; Adler et al. 2014) . Most commonly, such constraints embody limits on the timing of biological activity imposed by photoperiod at high latitudes, or solar irradiance at lower latitudes; temperature; moisture or precipitation; or some
combination of these. This book diverges somewhat from this well-established and long-standing view of phenology as a response dynamic. It will encourage a complementary view of phenology as the expression of an active strategy aimed at capturing and allocating an overlooked resource: time. The potentially controversial notion that time is a biological resource in and of itself is critical to making sense of the fact that, while phenological advances are widespread across taxa and biomes, they are not universal. This notion should help us understand why, in response to the same environmental stimulus, a diversity of phenological responses may ensue, and why this diversity is evident at the organismal level, the species level, and the community level. For instance, whether in response to drought, in response to warming, in response to variation in cloudiness and solar irradiance, or in response to snow melt timing, the timing of some life history events within an individual may advance while others become delayed or remain fixed. Similarly, the same sorts of environmental changes may elicit variable rates of advance or delay, or no response at all, across individuals within populations of a species. Or they may elicit different phenological responses among species at the same site. How do we explain such variability in an ecological and evolutionary context? Traditionally, we may view such patterns as adaptive phenological plasticity in response to variation in environmental seasonality. But we may also recognize such patterns as adaptive strategies once we view time as a resource, the allocation of which to development, maintenance, production, and reproduction determines fitness.
Ecology has circled around and brushed up against this notion for decades. It began with the idea that time is just one of many axes in the n-dimensional hypervolume of the niche along which species may segregate to minimize competition for other resources (Schoener 1974) . It surfaced soon thereafter in a treatment of butterfly phenology that observed that, in contrast to patterns seen in insects, the activity patterns of mammals and birds "are so nearly synchronous that time can almost be ruled out as a resource to be sub-divided among them" (Shapiro 1975) . And it has subsequently progressed through discussions of the "meaning of time" in metabolic rates and life spans of individuals (Schmidt-Nielsen 1984) , metabolic scaling laws (West et al. 1997; Brown et al. 2004) , and partitioning of time by interacting organisms (Kronfeld-Schor and Dayan 2003). More recently, ecologists have encouraged the development of frameworks for the treatment of time as one of the two major axes defining and determining ecological dynamics and patterns (the other being space) (Kelly et al. 2013; Wolkovich et al. 2014b) .
These arguments can be refined and nudged further toward a view of time that brings into clearer focus its functional role in ecology and evolution. This view has the potential to transform our conceptualization of and perception of time in ecology from that of a simple measure of occurrence and rate to that of a major
driver of the evolution of life history strategies and their variable expression. In essence, this transformation requires the development of a convincing argument for the case that time is not only a resource but also that time may in fact be the only resource of truly limited availability. This latter point rests on the notion that time, unlike other resources, cannot be stored. It can be used only to allocate or convert energy to other forms. Plants, for instance, make a living by converting time, solar energy, and carbon dioxide to biomass and offspring.
During the development of the ensuing theoretical framework, I have tried to be comprehensive in my thinking about arguments against this line of reasoning. The most obvious of these is that time is actually a construct of human consciousness and, as such, may not in actuality exist independently of human awareness (Mc Taggart 1908; Schultze 1908; Robertson 1923) . If time does not in fact exist, such an argument might go, then it cannot possibly be of use to living things, much less represent a resource. The cosmological theory of time, which argues that the apparent forward progression of time is a consequence of the expansion of the universe (Hawking 1969 (Hawking , 1985 , suggests, however, that time does exist independently of human awareness. More practical arguments against any eventual development of an ecological theory of time might include the observation that time is universally available to all organisms in any assemblage of co-occurring species, and cannot, therefore, be in limited supply. And if it is not in limited supply, then there cannot be competition for it, which weakens considerably its potential to act as a selective agent. Such counterarguments will be addressed, either directly or indirectly, in subsequent chapters as appropriate. Chapter 1, for instance, briefly reviews philosophical and cosmological theories of time, addressing questions of its existence, passage, and directionality. In doing so, the intent is both to challenge ecologists' preconceptions about time and its flow, and to thereby establish a foundation for thinking about time as more than simply a unidirectional arrow along which events and interactions unfold.
I have also tried to be comprehensive in my thinking about how to present parallels between time and other recognized biological resources, in hopes that this will bolster the argument for the consideration of time as a resource. These considerations will be presented in more detail in subsequent chapters, but here are the highlights. Like space, time may be available for use at many scales. The various scales at which time is available are recognizable as the units by which we measure it. Hence, during the progression of a particular reproductive season experienced by a long-lived organism, time may be available for use at scales of seconds, minutes, hours, days, and weeks, but not as years if the unit of a year exceeds the temporal scale of a reproductive season, even though time may have been allocated over the course of years to growth and development prior to reproduction.
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Furthermore, owing to the paradoxically unidirectional and recurrent nature of time, the misuse of time at shorter scales of availability may, in long-lived organisms, be compensated for over scales that are unavailable during any single reproductive season, such as years. As well, some forms of time are intertwined with space and the presence or absence of other organisms. But there is one important difference between time and other resources, and it is this difference that might lend primacy to the role of time in ecology. Unlike other resources, the use of time may not render it unavailable for use by other organisms. However, its use by an organism for one purpose, its allocation to one life history stage or set of life history events, does in fact render that time unavailable to that same organism for allocation to other life history stages. Obviously, an organism may simultaneously allocate time to growth while flowering or gestating offspring, for instance. But the timing of the transition from one phenophase to the next in an organism's life cycle cannot be reversed or altered once that transition has been made. Hence, phenology represents not only a tracking of the availability of other resources through time; it also represents a strategy of allocating other resources to the use of time itself for growth, maintenance, and offspring production.
Before developing a treatment of phenology centered on a theoretical framework for the role of time in ecology, it might be a worthwhile exercise to reflect for a moment upon our own perception of time in a traditional ecological context.
In other words, what is time in ecology?
Generally speaking, time is considered as a conceptual axis, much like space, along which we can measure ecological events and their durations. Conveniently, cosmology defines events as occurrences in time and space (Hawking 1988 (Hawking , 1990 . In ecology, time also allows us to describe, ascribe rates to, and quantify differences in, for example, changes in abundance within and among populations of single species and interacting species. It is used to quantify when events such as flowering times and other seasonal pulses of life history activity occur and to quantify changes in their occurrences in response to, for example, climatic warming. And so on. In such a framework, time is a measuring stick and half of the stage-the complementary half of which is space-upon which ecology plays out. As ecologists, we think we know what time is, and we know how to measure it as well as its ecological traces through the study of dynamics in many subdisciplines within ecology. But this knowledge is distinct from an understanding of the role of time in ecology. And no discipline is better suited to disclosing that role, and to the development and application of an ecological framework of time, than phenology.
Over the ensuing chapters, an argument will be constructed for the development of this theoretical framework. At the outset, however, I would like to present its main elements, while remaining cognizant of the fact that some elements of this list may be clear only in retrospect after more thorough treatment in the ensuing 6 I N T R O D U C T I O N chapters. These elements are as follows: First, time is a biological resource in and of itself. Second, the evolutionary context of timing is best understood as it relates to duration of life history phases critical to survival and reproduction. Phenology is most commonly studied in the context of the timing of events, but to better understand variation in timing and what drives it, ecologists should place more emphasis on the influence of variation in timing on the duration of phenophases. The allocation of time, and other resources constrained by it, to critical phenophases or life history stages has adaptive value in the context of duration. Third, phenological stasis, advance, and delay can all be interpreted as strategies employed by the individual organism to optimize duration of, or the allocation of time to, crucial life history stages or phenophases related to growth, development, maintenance, and offspring production. Fourth, although individuals may compete for time, resource limitation and competition for time occur most clearly within the individual. Once allocated to a specific phenophase, time cannot be reallocated to another phenophase within the individual. Fifth, time used by the individual occurs as absolute cosmological time, recurrent time, and relative ecological time. Individual organisms use recurrent and relative ecological time to perpetuate their genes through cosmological time. In fact, the evolution of life history strategies that promote the use of recurrent and relative ecological time can be viewed as an elegant solution to a problem faced by all living organisms: contending with the irreversible, unidirectional, and inexorable passage of cosmological time. Last, phenological patterns that emerge at the population, species, and community levels derive from the strategic allocation of time at the individual level. Before the argument for this framework is presented, however, let us begin, in the next chapter, with a brief examination of time itself.
